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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of large 
number of low-cost, resource-constrained sensor 
nodes. The constraints of the wireless sensor node is 
their characteristics which include low memory, low 
computation power, they are deployed in hostile area 
and left unattended, small range of communication 
capability and low energy capabilities. Base on those 
characteristics makes this network vulnerable to 
several attacks, such as sinkhole attack. Sinkhole 
attack is a type of attack were compromised node 
tries to attract network traffic by advertise its fake 
routing update. One of the impacts of sinkhole attack 
is that, it can be used to launch other attacks like 
selective forwarding attack, acknowledge spoofing 
attack and drops or altered routing information. It 
can also used to send bogus information to base 
station. This paper is focus on exploring and 
analyzing the existing solutions which used to detect 
and identify sinkhole attack in wireless sensor 
network. The analysis is based on advantages and 
limitation of the proposed solutions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor network consists of small nodes with 
ability to sense and send data to base station [5].  
Wireless sensor network is used in different applications 
example in military activities, which used to track 
movement of their enemy. It also used in fire detection 
and in healthy service for monitoring heart beat [2, 17, 
13]. Unfortunately most of wireless network are 
deployed in unfriendly area and normally left 
unattended. Also most of their routing protocols do not 
consider security aspect due to resource constraints 
which include low computational power, low memory, 
low power supply and low communication range [8,9].  
This constraint creates chance for several attackers to 
easily attack wireless sensor network. An example of 
attack is sinkhole attack. Sinkhole attack is implemented 
in network layer where an adversary tries to attract many 
traffic with the aim to prevent base station from 
receiving a complete sensing data from nodes [20].The 
adversary normally compromises the node and that node 
will be used to launch an attack. The compromised node 
send fake information to neighboring nodes about its link 
quality which used in routing metric to select best route 
during data transmission. Then all the packets from his 
neighbors pass through him before reach to base station. 
[22]. Sinkhole attack prevents base station from 
acquiring a complete and correct sensing data from 
nodes. 
The purpose of this paper is to study existing solutions 
used to detect sinkhole attack. Different solutions which 
were used to detect and identified sinkhole attack were 
suggested by different researchers, such as Krontiris 
[14], Ngai et al [18] and Sheela et al [25]. Rule based 
detection solution were proposed by Krontiris et al[15] 
to detect sinkhole attack. All the rules were focused on 
node impersonation and were implanted in intrusion 
detection system. Then intruder was easily detected 
when they violate either of the rules. Another centralized 
solution which involve base station in detection process 
proposed by Ngai et al [18]  A non cryptography scheme 
which used mobile agent in the network to prevent 
sinkhole attack was also proposed by Sheela et al [25] 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. 
Section 2 discusses sinkhole attack and their attack 
mechanism in two different protocols. Section 3 presents 
the challenges in detection of sinkhole attack in wireless 
sensor network. Section 4 presents different approaches 
that proposed by different researchers to detect sinkhole 
attack. Finally, section 5 conclude this paper and 
proposed some future works. 
 
II. SINKHOLE ATTACK 
Sinkhole attack is an insider attack were an intruder 
compromise a node inside the network and launches an 
attack. Then the compromise node try to attract all the 
traffic from neighbor nodes based on the routing metric 
that used in routing protocol. When it managed to 
achieve that, it will launch an attack. Due to 
communication pattern of wireless sensor network of 
many to one communication where each node send data 
to base station, makes this WSN vulnerable to sinkhole 
attack (Ngai et al [18]).  
The following subsections discuss the techniques use in 
MintRoute protocol and AODV protocol in launching 
sinkhole attack. 
Figure 1: Sinkhole attack in MintRoute protocol (Krontiris, I[15]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Sinkhole in TinyAODV protocol (Teng and Zhang,[27]) 
 
 
Sinkhole Attack in MintRoute Protocol  
MintRoute protocol is a type of protocol which is 
commonly used in wireless sensor network.  It was 
designed purposely for the wireless sensor network, it is 
light and suitable for sensor nodes which have minimum 
storage capacity, low computation power and limited 
power supply.  MintRoute protocol uses link quality as a 
metric to choose the best route to send packet to the Base 
Station (Krontiris et al [15]). 
Fig.1 shows six sensor nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F.  Node 
C is malicious, and it is going to launch a sinkhole 
attack. The Figure 1(a) shows a route table of node A 
with IDs of its neighbors with their corresponding link 
quality.  Originally the parent node was node B but node 
C advertises its link quality with a value of 255 which is 
maximum value.  Node A is not going to change its 
parent node until the node B’s link quality fall to 25 
below the absolute value. 
In Fig.1(b) the malicious node is sending new update 
route packet that the link quality fall up to 20 and 
impersonate node B so that node A believe the packet 
come from node B. Node A will update its route table 
and change the parent node to node C (Krontiris et al 
[15]). The attacker uses node impersonation to launch an 
attack. 
 
Sinkhole Attack in TinyAODV Protocol 
This is another explanation of sinkhole attack in wireless 
sensor network and this time the attack is launched under 
TinyAODV (Ad-hoc On Demand Vector) protocol. 
TinyAODV protocol is the same as AODV in MANET 
but this one is lighter compared to AODV and it was 
modified purposely for wireless sensor network [27]. 
The number of hops to base station is the routing metric 
that used in this protocol. Generally the route from 
source to destination is created when one of the nodes 
send a request, the source node sends a RREQ (Route 
request) packet to his neighbors when wants to send 
packet. Next one of the neighbors close to destination is 
reply by sending back RREP (Route Reply) packet, if 
not the packet is forwarded to other nodes close to that 
destination. Finally, the source receives RREP packet 
from neighbor then select one node with less number of 
hops to destination. 
The sinkhole node or compromised node launches an 
attack by send back RREP packet. In RREP packet it 
gives small number of hops which indicates close 
proximity to the base station. Then the source node 
decides to forward packet to sinkhole node. The 
compromised node then performs the same technique to 
its entire neighbors and tries to attract as much traffic as 
possible [27]. 
For instance, Fig.2 shows node M launches sinkhole 
attack in Tiny AODV. Node A sends RREQ to nodes 
BCM. However node M instead of broadcast to node E 
like nodes B and C does to node D, he replies back 
RREP to node A. Then node A will reject node B and C, 
then forward packet to M because node A and B are very 
far to F compare to node M. 
 
III.  CHALLENGES IN DETECTION OF 
SINKHOLE ATTACK IN WSNs 
Based on the literature review of sinkhole attack in 
wireless sensor network, the following are the main 
challenges in detecting sinkhole attack in wireless sensor 
network 
A. Communication Pattern in WSN;  
All the messages from sensor nodes in wireless sensor 
network are destined to base station. This created 
opportunity for sinkhole to launch an attack. Sinkhole 
attacks normally occur when compromised node send 
fake routing information to other nodes in the network 
with aim of attracting as many traffic as possible. Based 
on that communication pattern the intruder will only 
compromised the nodes which are close to base station 
instead of targeting all nodes in the network. This is 
considered as challenges because the communication 
pattern itself provides opportunity for attack. 
  
B. Sinkhole attack is unpredictable;  
In wireless sensor network the packet are transmitted 
based on routing metric that used by different routing 
protocols [26]. The compromised node used its routing 
metric that used by routing protocol to lie to his 
neighbors in order to launch sinkhole attack. Then all the 
data from his neighbors to base station will pass through 
compromised node. For example the techniques used by 
compromised node in network that used TinyAODV 
protocol is different to the one used another protocol like 
MintRoute protocol. In MintRoute they used link quality 
as route metric while in Tiny AODV they used number 
of hop to base station as routing metric. Therefore the 
sinkhole attack techniques is changed based on routing 
metric of routing protocol  
 
C. Insider Attack 
Insider attack and outsider attack are two categories of 
attack in wireless sensor network. Outside attack is when 
intruder is not part of network. In inside attack the 
intruder compromises one of the legitimate node through 
node tempering or through weakness in its system 
software then compromised node inject false information 
in network after listen to secret information. Inside 
attack can disrupt the network by modifying routing 
packet. Through compromised node sinkhole attack 
attract nearly all the traffic from particular area after 
making that compromised node attractive to other nodes. 
The fact is that compromised node possesses adequate 
access privilege in the network and has knowledge 
pertaining to valuable information about the network 
topology this created challenges in detecting. Base to 
that situation even cryptographic cannot defend against 
insider attack although it provides integrity, 
confidentiality and authentication (Pathan, K [22]). 
Therefore the internal attack has more serious impact on 
victim system compared to outsider attack. 
 
D. Resource Constraints;  
The limited power supply, low communication range, 
low memory capacity and low computational power are 
the main constrained in wireless sensor network that 
hinder implementation of strong security mechanism. 
For example the strong cryptographic method that used 
in other network cannot be implemented in this network 
due to low computational power and low memory 
capacity. Therefore less strong key are considered which 
is compatible with available resources. 
 
E. Physical attack;  
A wireless sensor network normally deployed in hostile 
environment and left unattended. This provides a 
opportunity for an intruder to attack a node physically 
and get access to all necessary information [12]. 
 
 
IV.    EXISTING APPROACHES  
Many researchers have been working on wireless sensor 
field to provide security mechanism to suits the resource 
constrained due to growing demand of applications in 
sensitive areas. The following are the identified 
approaches that used by different researchers to detect 
and identified sinkhole attack in wireless sensor network. 
Those approaches are classified into rules based, key 
management, anomaly based, statistical method and 
hybrid based. The subsequent subsections described each 
of these categories and give examples of existing work 
that used that approach. 
 
 
 
  
A. Rule based  
The rules are designed based on the behavior or 
technique used to launch sinkhole attack. Then those 
rules are imbedding in intrusion detection system which 
runs on each sensor nodes. Those rules were then applied 
to the packet transmitted through the network nodes. If 
any node violates the rules is considered as adversary 
and isolated from the network. 
Among the existing work which used rules based 
approach include Krontiris et al [14]. Krontiris used rule 
based approach to detect sinkhole attack. They create 
two rules and implanted in Intrusion detection system 
(IDS). When one of the rules is violated by one of the 
nodes, the intrusion detection system triggered an alarm 
but it does not provide node ID of compromised node. 
The first rule “for each overhead route update packet the 
ID of the sender must be different your node ID”. The 
second rule “for each overhead route update packet the 
ID of the sender must be one of the node ID in your 
neighbors”. Also Krontiris et al [15] used the same 
approaches. There are two rules, the first rule “rule for 
each overhead route update packet the ID of the sender 
must be one of node ID in your neighbors”. The second 
rule “for each pair of parent and child node their link 
quality they advertise for the link between them, the 
difference cannot exceed 50. 
B. Anomaly-based detection 
 In anomaly based detection the normal user behavior is 
defined and intrusion detection is searching for anything 
that is anomalous in the network. In this method 
intrusion is considered as anomalous activity because it 
looks abnormal compare to normal behavior. The rule 
based and statistical approaches are also included under 
anomaly based detection approach.  
Tumrongwittayapak and Varakulsiripunth [29] proposed 
system that used RSSI (Received Signal Strength 
Indicator) value with the help of EM (Extra Monitor) 
nodes to detect sinkhole attack. The EM had high 
communication range and one of their functions is to 
calculate RSSI of node and send to base station with ID 
of source and next hop. This process happens instantly 
when node are deployed.  Base station uses that RSSI 
value to calculate VGM (visual geographical map).  That 
VGM shows the position of each node, then later when 
EM send updated RSSI value and base station identify 
there is change in packet flow from previous data this 
indicate there is sinkhole attack. The compromised node 
is identified and isolated from the network by base 
station using VGM value. However, if attack is launched 
immediately after network deployment, the system will 
not be able to detect that attack [29]. Also the numbers 
of EM nodes were not specified for specific number of 
sensor nodes and the proposed method is focused only 
on static network. 
C. Statistical method  
In statistical approaches the data associated with certain 
activities of the nodes in network is studied and recorded 
by researchers. For example monitor the normal packet 
transmitted between the nodes or monitor resource 
depletion of the nodes like CPU usage. Then the 
adversary or compromised node is detected by 
comparing the actual behavior with the threshold value 
which used as reference, if any nodes exceed that value 
is considered as an intruder. 
Chen, et al [3], proposed statistical GRSh (Girshick-
RubinShyriaev)–based algorithm for detecting malicious 
nodes in wireless sensor network. Base station calculates 
the difference of CPU usage of each node after 
monitoring the CPU usage of each node in fixed time. 
Base station would identify whether a node is malicious 
or not after comparing the difference of CPU usage with 
the threshold. 
Dynamic trust management system was proposed by 
Roy et al [23] to detect and eliminate multiple attacks 
such as sinkhole attack. Each node calculates the trust of 
its neighbor node based on experience of interaction; 
recommendation and knowledge then sends to base 
station. The base station decided which node is sinkhole 
after it received several trust values from other nodes. 
Therefore the trust value of the node which falls beyond 
the normal value 0.5 is considered as sinkhole attack 
[23]. 
 
 
D. Hybrid based intrusion detection  
The combination of both anomaly and signature based or 
misused based is used in this approach. The false 
positive rate which produced by anomaly based is 
reduced in this approach due to the use of both method. 
Also the advantage of this approach is to be able to catch 
any suspicious nodes which their signature is not 
included in detection database.  
Coppolino and Spagnuolo [6] proposed hybrid Intrusion 
detection system to detect sinkhole attack and other 
attacks. They used detection agent which was 
responsible for identifying sinkhole attack. The hybrid 
intrusion detection was attached to sensor node and share 
resource of that node.  The suspicious nodes were 
inserted to the blacklist based on anomalous behavior 
after analyzed the collected data from neighbors. Then 
that list is sent to central agent to make final decision 
based on feature of attack pattern (misused based). 
Similar to solution proposed by Tumrongwittayapak and 
Varakulsiripunth [29], it was designed for static wireless 
sensor network. 
E. Key management  
In key management approach the integrity and 
authenticity of packet travels within the network is 
protected by using encryption and decryption key. Any 
packet transmitted in the network is added with another 
message in a way that to access that message requires a 
key and any small modification of the message can be 
easily detected. Those keys also help nodes to check if 
the message comes from base station and check the 
authenticity of the message.  
Papadimitriou et al [21] proposed a cryptographic 
approach in routing protocol to address the problem of 
sinkhole attack. Each node obtained public key which 
used to verify if the message comes from base station.  
They also used pair of public and private keys for 
authentication and sign data message.  All keys were 
uploaded offline before the network was deployed. Their 
techniques prevented any node to hide its ID and any 
packet forgery between nodes in the network. This 
protocol is focused on resistance to sinkhole attack but 
not to detect and eliminate it. 
 
Meanwhile, Fessant et al [10] proposed two protocols 
which used cryptographic method to increase the 
resilience of sinkhole attack. Both protocols prevent 
malicious node from lying about their advertised 
distances to base station. However, they did not show the 
memory usage of their protocols and message size. 
 
The summary of existing works using the previously 
described approaches is shown in Table 1.The summary 
covers evaluation results of proposed solution and their 
limitations 
 
Table 1: Existing works on Sinkhole detection 
Approach Proposed 
Solution 
Result Limitations/Advantages 
Rule Based. 
Krontiris et al 
2007 [16] 
 
They extended 
their IDS which 
can detect 
sinkhole attack.  
 the success of intrusion 
detection system depend on 
the increase number of 
watchdog 
 When the network density 
increase the false negative rate 
decrease. 
 
Limitations 
 Memory and network overhead 
was created. 
 They used MintRoute protocol 
 Node impersonation was the 
focus of the rules. 
 
Advantages 
 More secure and robust measure 
can be developed based on 
valuable principle they develop. 
Rule Based. 
Krontiris et al 
2008 [15] 
 
They proposed 
detection rules 
that will keep 
aware 
legitimate node 
the existing of 
attack. 
 They show how vulnerabilities 
of MultihopLQI can be 
exploited by sinkhole node 
and suggest the rules which 
make the protocol more 
resilient. 
Limitation 
 They did not show practically 
how those rules can prevent 
attack.  
 All the rules are only detecting 
attack but cannot give ID of 
sinkhole node. 
 They assume attacker has the 
same power as normal node and 
can capture sensor node and 
change the internal state. 
 
Anomaly 
based. 
Tumrongwitta
yapak, C and 
Varakulsiripun
th, R 2009 
[29] 
They proposed 
detection 
solution based 
on received 
signal strength 
indicator(RSSI) 
Their proposed 
 For 0 to 40% percentage of  
message drop the detection 
rate is 100% 
 False positive rate was 0 for 0-
40% of message drop but 
increase when percentage drop 
increase 
 The same applied to false 
negative rate with the more 
Limitation 
 They assume sensor network are 
static 
 No instant attack 
 Base station remain 0,0 position 
 Base station and extra monitor 
node are physically protected. 
 Their proposed solution can not 
detect attack if it happened 
solution 
required 
support from 
extra monitor 
node 
message drop the more 
negative rate. 
instantly after network 
deployment. 
Anomaly 
based. 
Choi et al 2009 
[4] 
They proposed 
method that can 
detect sinkhole  
attack that used 
LQI (link 
quality 
indicator). 
 The probability of detection 
increase when number of 
detector nodes increase 
 detection rate increase when 
detector node increase 
 The false positive rate depend 
on extent of tolerance value 
(constant value which will 
show if changes is beyond 
abnormal) 
Limitations 
 All sensor node have no mobility 
 The detection of sinkhole occurs 
when detector node is between 
sinkhole node and source node 
and sinkhole and base station 
 The detector nodes have high 
source of energy than sensor 
nodes 
Advantage 
 Detector node communicate 
themselves through exclusive 
channel 
 
Anomaly 
based. 
Sharmila, S. 
and 
Umamaheswar
i, G. 2011. 
[24] 
-They proposed 
message digest 
algorithm to 
detect sinkhole 
node. 
 The results show the algorithm 
worked well when malicious 
nodes are below 50% 
 False positive rate was 20%( 
due to packet drop) that figure 
obtained when malicious node 
reach 50 
 False negative error was 10% 
but was increasing when 
malicious node reach above 40 
Limitation 
 Network throughput, overhead 
and communication cost was not 
calculated 
 The performance was not good 
when there is node collision, 
limited transmitted power and 
packet drops 
 Only one advertisement is 
considered at a time, after 
computation another take place 
Advantage 
 The algorithm achieve data 
integrity and authenticity 
Key 
Management. 
Papadimitriou 
et al 2009 
[21] 
-They proposed 
two RESIST 
protocols which 
increase 
resilience to 
sinkhole attack 
in WSN 
 
-Results show that RESIST-0 has 
high resilience to sinkhole attack 
(it does not allow node to lie about 
their distance to base station) than 
other protocol 
 
Limitation 
 Resist-0 is very expensive it 
require two additional message 
to a packet  
 In their simulation message 
losses and collusion were not 
considered 
 Collusion node has impact on 
RESIST-0 not in RESIST-1 
 Their routing algorithm relying 
on tree-based topology 
construction 
 Route tree is built by hop 
distance 
Advantage 
 RESIST-1 prevent malicious 
nodes from changing their 
advertised distance to the sink 
more than one hop 
 RESIST-0 completely stops any 
lying about distance. 
Statistical 
based 
Chen et al 
2010 
[3] 
They develop 
an algorithm 
which detect 
sinkhole attack 
and identified 
intruder. 
 From first simulation the 
detection time increase when 
threshold (CPU value) become 
bigger 
 Also the false positive rate 
decrease when threshold 
become bigger. 
 From the second simulation 
the detection time did not 
change too much but the false 
positive rate  increase due to 
increase in traffic 
 
Limitation 
 Base station makes the final 
decision on which node is 
malicious 
 No results on the network 
overhead 
 The scheme will not detect 
attack if it launch instantly after 
deployed 
 Assumption-base station is 
trustworthy and it participates in 
detection system. 
Advantages 
 Their algorithm showed that it 
can detect malicious node in 
short time with low false 
positive rate 
Hybrid base 
Coppolino et al 
2007 
[6] 
They proposed 
intrusion 
detection 
system which 
was able to 
protect critical 
information 
from attacks 
directs from its 
WSN. 
 Detection rate was 95-97% 
when malicious node modified 
sensor packet. 
 Detection rate was 93-96% 
when malicious node modified 
the r 
 False positive rate is 3% 
 IDS usage in real sensor 
network was 734bytes (RAM) 
and 3208bytes (ROM)  
 
Advantage 
 Their solution satisfied the 
available resource in sensor 
nodes 
 Their solution proved to detect 
sinkhole attack 
 They used both anomaly and 
misuse based method 
 
A non 
cryptographic 
Sheela, D et al 
2011 
[25] 
They proposed 
scheme which 
used mobile 
agent to defend 
against this 
attack 
 Probability of detecting  
sinkhole is decrease when 
nodes increase 
 Node average energy decrease 
as time goes up because of 
storage information. 
 The algorithm create high 
network overheads 
Limitation 
 Mobile wireless sensor network 
 No specification of exactly 
number of MA(mobile agent) in 
network 
 Matrix method is very complex 
with relate to available resources 
 MA communicate with sensor 
nodes at active mode only 
Advantage 
 MA used dummy data to detect 
modification 
 MA has sufficient power to run 
its activities 
 
  
V.  DISCUSSION 
From the Table 1, it shows most approaches managed 
to detect and prevent sinkhole attack in WSN.  
Rule based approaches managed to detect sinkhole 
attack but it creates memory and network overhead. This 
approach did not give the ID of sinkhole node after 
detection of attack. All the rules focus on the node 
impersonation. 
Anomaly based approach also manage to detect sinkhole 
attack but they just focus on static wireless sensor 
network. This approach created high false positive rate 
when there was high message dropping. 
Key management was another approach which focused 
on resistance to sinkhole attack but not to detect and 
eliminate it. 
Statistical based approach managed to detect sinkhole 
attack but they did not give result of the network 
overhead. Also this approach cannot detect an instant 
attack after WSN is deployed. False positive rate were 
the main drawback to this approach. 
Hybrid based intrusion detection approach used the 
combination of both anomaly and signature-based. This 
approach detected sinkhole attack but was designed for 
static WSN. It produced less false positive rate. 
A non cryptographic is another approach which detected 
sinkhole attack but it created high network overhead. 
All the approaches managed to detect, identify and 
provided resistance to sinkhole attack. The major 
drawbacks produce by those approaches includes high 
network and memory overhead, create high false positive 
rate and some were not able to work on mobile WSN. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Based on existing works most researchers are trying to 
look for ICT solutions for detecting, identifying and 
providing resistance to sinkhole attack in wireless sensor 
network. Researchers used intrusion detection scheme 
based on anomaly-method, other used rule based and key 
management to detect and identifying the sinkhole 
nodes. Majority of researches struggled with security 
challenges corresponding with availability of resources 
and mobility of wireless sensor nodes. Some provided 
solution for only static and few on mobile network. Very 
few researchers managed to validate their security 
system using real wireless sensor network. Also some of 
results showed low detection rate, high network 
overhead and high communication cost. The future 
solution should focus on reducing high network 
overhead, computational power, increase detection rate 
and that system must be validated in real sensor network. 
Through this kind of validation, it will be easy to check 
if their solutions meet the available resources of WSN, 
such as memory capacity. 
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